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PATENTS-PRIOR PUBLICATION-APPLICATION OF SECTION 102(B) TO PLANT 
PATENTS-Appellant applied for a plant patent on two roses1 which he had 
developed. The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the final rejection 
of the application on the basis of section 102(b)2 of the patent statute. 
Pictures and classifications of the varieties of roses sought to be patented 
had appeared in printed publications3 more than one year before appellant's 
1 Rosa Floribunda plants, application serial numbers 709,127 and 709,128, filed 
Jan. 15, 1958. 
!l 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1958): "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ••. (b) 
the invention was described in a printed publication .•. more than one year prior to 
the date of application for patent in the United States ...• " 
3 A printed publication is anything that is printed and made accessible to any part 
of the public. See, e.g., Rosenwasser v. Spieth, 129 U.S. 47 (1889); Interchemical Corp. 
v. Sinclair & Carroll Co., 50 F. Supp. 881, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). However, the mere 
existence of a printed thing is not a printed publication. See Britton v. White Mfg. Co., 
61 Fed. 93 (C.C.D. Conn. 1894); Cottier v. Stimson, 20 Fed. 906 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884). 
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application.4 On appeal, held, reversed. In order to bar issuance of a plant 
patent, a description in a printed publication must convey such knowledge 
as to place the invention within the public domain. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 
929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
The provisions of the statute pertaining to plant patents grant to whom-
ever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new 
variety of plant5 the right to exclude others from asexually reproducing 
the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced.6 In addition, they 
require that all of the provisions relating to patents for other inventions, 
except where specifically excluded, shall be applicable to plant patents.7 
Thus, in order to qualify for the granting of a plant patent, petitioner 
must, among other things, satisfy section 102(b),8 which determines one of 
the requisite conditions for the existence of patentable novelty. Since the 
application of section 102(b) to plants had not been adjudicated prior to 
this case, the arguments presented by both parties were based substantially 
on policy. These arguments can be resolved into two issues. The first is 
whether the description under section 102(b), in order to bar patentability 
of inventions in general, must be so complete as to enable a person skilled 
in the art or science to which it appertains to practice the invention, while 
the second issue is whether the construction of section 102(b), when applied 
to plants, should be the same as that applied to patents for other inventions. 
The respondent asserted that a mere description, although insufficient to 
place the plant in the public domain, would be adequate to bar the issuance 
of the patent,9 while the petitioner argued that the requisite description to 
bar patentability must be an "enabling" one.10 There is force to the reason-
ing in support of both of these positions; however, the latter, accepted in 
the principal case, seems to be the more compelling and necessary conclu-
sion. This is true not only from a simple resolution of the issues on the 
basis of precedent, but from a consideration of the practical consequences 
which result from each of the two contradicting interpretations when viewed 
in the light of the policies and goals of the patent system. 
The question of whether an enabling description is required under sec-
tion 102(b) for all patents, other than plants, is of prime importance to the 
basic purposes of the patent system. There is no logical foundation in the 
4 1949 NAT'L RosE Soc'Y ANNUAL OF ENG. 155, and 1954 NAT'L RosE Soc'y ANNUAL 
OF ENG. 156, 157. 
5 Congress in using the word "plant" was speaking in the common language of the 
people and did not use the word in its strict scientific sense. In re Arzberger, 27 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1315, 112 F.2d 834 (1940). 
6 35 u.s.c. §§ 161, 163 (1958). 
7 35 u.s.c. § 161 (1958). 
8 See note 2 supra. 
9 Brief for Appellee, p. 5. 
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 22. An "enabling" description must contain and exhibit a 
substantial representation of the patented improvement so as to enable any person skilled 
in the art or science to which it appertains to make, construct, and practice the invention. 
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870). See principal case at 936. 
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field of patents for following a "mere description" test. The theory behind 
the publication bar of section 102(b) is that, once an invention has been 
placed in the public domain, no one shall be permitted to recapture it by 
means of a patent monopoly.11 Thus, if the description is not enabling, 
it is clear that the invention has not been placed in the public domain, and 
patentability should not be barred. This is illustrated by the familiar 
practice of viewing the patent grant as being analogous to a contract.12 
If the disclosure is an enabling one, the patent should not be issued since 
the public derives no benefit thereby and there is no consideration given 
by the applicant for the grant of such a limited monopoly.13 In accordance 
with this view, the majority of cases have required that, in order to invoke 
the restriction contemplated by section 102(b), the description must be 
such as to enable one who is skilled in the particular art to duplicate the 
invention.14 These decisions are reinforced by the writers, who are unani-
mous in their recognition of the desirability of this position.15 Thus, com-
pelled by the weight of authority and the logical development underlying 
it, the court in the principal case found it necessary to criticize and dis-
tinguish those decisions which had held that section I02(b) does not require 
an enabling description.10 
Despite the absence of any authority clearly contrary to the proposition 
that an enabling description is also required to bar plant patents, the 
court's conclusion in that regard should be examined in the light of the 
congressional intent and the public policy underlying the patent laws. 
Unfortunately, the fact that tlie Plant Patent Act was passed in great haste, 
coupled with the lack of any clearly pertinent manifestations of congres-
sional intent, leads to the conclusion that the problem presented by the 
principal case was probably not recognized, and almo~t certainly was not 
11 l SMITH, PATENT LAW vii (1954). 
12 ALLYN, THE FIRST PLANT PATENTS 18, 19 (1934). 
13 Id. at 19. 
14 Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 66 (1887); Downton v. Yeager Milling Co., 108 
U.S. 466 (1883); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870); Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation v. George A. Breon & Co., 85 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 299 U.S. 598 (1936); Young Radiator Co. v. Modine Mfg. Co., 55 F.2d 545 (7th 
Cir. 1931); De Cew v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 57 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.J. 1944). 
111 CURTIS, PATENTS § 294 (4th ed. 1873); 1 ROBINSON, PATENTS §§ 325-30 (1890); 
1 WALKER, PATENTS § 50 (Deller ed. 1937). 
16 Cohn v. United States Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366 (1876). Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals: In re Attwood, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 824, 253 F.2d 234 (1958); In re Baranauckas, 
43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 727, 228 F.2d 413 (1955); In re Inman, 43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 709, 228 
F.2d 229 (1955); In re Kebrich, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 780, 201 F.2d 951 (1953); In re 
Shackell, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 847, 194 F.2d 720 (1952); In re Michalek, 34 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1124, 162 F.2d 229 (1947); In re Stoll, 34 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1058, 161 F.2d 241 
(1947); In re Crosley, 34 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 882, 159 F.2d 735 (1947); In re Fink, 20 
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 716, 62 F.2d 103 (1932); In re Marden & Rentschler, 18 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1119, 48 F.2d 428 (1931). Circuit and District Courts: Merck & Co. v. Marzall, 
197 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1957), 
aff'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958); General Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio, 17 F.2d 90 
(D. Del. 1927); One-Piece Bifocal Lens Co. v. Bisight Co., 246 Fed. 450 (D. Md. 1917), 
decree modified, 259 Fed. 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 606 (1919). 
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resolved by Congress at the time of passage.17 On the other hand, when 
viewed from the standpoint of the public interest, it can be seen that the 
result in the principal case more nearly conforms to the goals of the patent 
system. It has been stated that the purposes of the patent grant are to en-
courage and reward inventors,18 expand the general distribution of the 
invention for the benefit of the public,19 and to make it finally available 
to all after seventeen years.20 The relevant theory is that a patent is similar 
to a contract, the consideration for the grant by the government being the 
disclosure to the public of something worthwhile which would not other-
wise have been known.21 When considered from the standpoint of patent 
policy, the practical consequences of denial of a plant patent, merely on the 
basis of a prior but non-enabling description, are significant. If the plant 
application is denied, the applicant is faced with two choices. He must 
either place the plant on the market, making excessive charges for specimens 
in order to avail himself of his only opportunity for financial reimburse-
ment before clippings of his plant are reproduced and marketed by an-
other in competition, or he must keep the original plant off the market so 
as to avoid competition with another subsequently patented plant, created 
by him from the original plant, and possessing the desirable features of the 
original. Neither of these results is in the public interest or within the basic 
philosophy of the patent statute. The first alternative would lead to high 
prices and limited distribution, while the second would make the plant 
inaccessible to the public in favor of a substitute. On the other hand, the 
uniform application of section 102(b) to all inventions, including plants, 
would allow for the rewarding of the inventor and a wider distribution to 
the public at a lower price, without recapturing anything already made 
available to the public in the prior publication. 
The ramifications resulting from the court's application of section 102(b) 
are twofold. The first is the effect it will have on clarifying the standard 
17 See ALLYN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 57. The intent of Congress was to encourage 
the invention and discovery of new plants by providing agriculture with the same op• 
portunity as that provided by the patent system to the ,manufacturing industry. H.R. 
REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. I (1930). The intent to place agriculturists on the 
same level as others can arguably be relied upon for the proposition that Congress 
intended § 102(b) to be applied in the same manner for all patents. However, the fact 
that this intent is limited to the "practicable" lends credence to the argument that only 
the same opportunity, and not the same tests, should apply. And although § 162 of the 
act [35 U.S.C. § 162 (1958)] provides that the disclosure of a plant patent application 
need only present as complete a description as is reasonably possible, thus intimating 
that Congress was aware of the virtual impossibility of providing an enabling description 
of a plant, any conclusion therefrom as to a possible congressional resolution of the 
problem is mere conjecture. 
1s E.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir, 
1943); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir), 
cert. granted, 207 U.S. 589, petition for cert. dismissed, 210 U.S. 439 (1907). 
19 E.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945); 
Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1947). 
20 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1958). 
21 See ALLYN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 18, 19. 
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applied to all patents under section 102(b). Although this court cannot over-
rule the Supreme Court or the other circuits, its handling of the principal 
case should cause a reconsideration of the loose language used in the inter-
pretation of this section, and may well influence those courts to adopt the 
test which requires an enabling description. The second ramification of the 
court's decision is more closely related to the initial problem of the principal 
case, in that it results from the struggle to find an acceptable solution of how 
to apply section 102(b) to plants. Under the court's decision many problems 
are still present and unsolved. The anomaly of having section 102(b) pro-
hibit an impossibility when applied to plant patents is still present, because 
an enabling description of a plant cannot be made.22 In addition, there is 
no way to prevent the patentee from extending his monopoly by advertising 
and showing the plant for many years, and then, after a demand has been 
created, applying for patent protection. And finally, the contract analogy 
fails because the consideration given by the patentee can be negated by the 
disappearance or extinction of the plant, as there is no guarantee provided 
by an enabling disclosure that the patented item will ever enter the public 
domain. 
The remedy for these problems, as well as others, cannot be handled 
by the courts within the present statutory framework. A feasible solution 
seems possible only through remedial legislation. As an initial step it might 
be well to abolish the applicability of substantive provisions to both plant 
and other patents, since there is no logical reason why the goal of the 
patent system cannot be effectuated without relating the general provi-
sions of title 35 to plant patents. A chapter with autonomous provisions 
would immediately relieve the existence of the section 102(b) "anomaly" 
and others which might be latently present. In addition, in order to assure 
that the plant will not become extinct before expiration of the patent, a 
provision could be enacted requiring the placement of a sample with the 
patent office, so that clippings would be available to the public. If physical 
and economic factors would limit the applicability of this provision, a 
compulsory licensing system could be initiated. Another possible provision 
which •might be enacted would be one which would cause the length of the 
term of protection of the patent to be decreased by the delay between the 
date of prior publication and the filing of the patent application. This 
would not only curb the possible problem of the extension of patent pro-
tection, but would provide for the encouragement of the statutory standard 
which provides for the granting of patents only to "new" varieties.23 Al-
though these recommendations for remedial legislation are far from com-
prehensive, they do evidence the need for a new approach based on a re-
examination of the plant patent provisions. 
Ira ]. Jaffe, S.Ed. 
22 This is true under the restrictions of today's scientific knowledge; however, advance-
ments in this area arc likely to result from the active research in the field. See principal 
case at 939 n.7. 
23 35 u.s.c. § 161 (1958). 
